# LETTER

FROM A

### Person of DISTINCTION

TO THE

Rt. Hon. 7--- E--- of Eg---t.

Occasioned by the

Publication of Three late PAMPHLETS,

Entitled,

An Examination of the Principles, &c. &c.


An Occasional Letter concerning the Treaty of Hanau,

A Second Series of Facts and Arguments.

Cui compositis rebus nulla spes, omne concilium in turbido fuit. TACITUS.

#### LONDON:

Printed for J. COBHAM, near St. Paul's.





#### A

## LETTER, &c.

My Lord,

ERMIT me to congratulate your Lordship on the exquisite Pleasure, I know a Man of your Complexion must feel, on contemplating your late acquired Reputation as an Author, and the great Effect, you, no doubt, flatter yourfelf, your political Writings have had on the Public. Before this happy Period, your Lordship's great Talents were confined to the Admiration of a few Senators, who were so happy as to be Witnesses of your wonderful Abilities, as an Orator and Statesman; but the Bulk of the Nation were ftill ignorant, that this Age was fo happy as to be bleffed with a Genius fo exalted, as that your Lordship is posfessed of. But now your eminent Qualifications are no longer confined within the Walls of St. Stephen's, or epitomized in a wretched Magazine; they are become conspicuous to all Mankind; and every Cobler for Two or Three Shillings, or perhaps for Three-Pence, has an Opportunity to admire the unfearchable Depth of your Understanding, the Elegance of your flowing Stile, the Delicacy of your Expressions, the melodious Cadency and emphatical Turns of your Periods,

Periods, with all the mafterly Stroaks of Oratory, which diffinguithes you from all your cotemporary Writers; but above all, that Spirit which gives Life and Energy to the whole, and that Perspecuity of Reasoning, and elevated Genius, which shines in every Line of your great Performance. How happy, my Lord, must the Man be, who knows himself possessed of all these rare Qualifications, with fuch Opportunities of displaying them? But your Lordship is not only happy in fuch great and shining Abilities, but superlatively so in the Choice of a Subject to employ them on. Next to Religion, which is rather too folemn for your Lordship's Turn of Thought, Politics is certainly the nobleft: This you have pitched upon, and particularly the most popular Branch; the Liberty of the People, and the Happiness of your Country: And had your Lordship been so happy as to convince your Readers, that you fincerely had in View, fomething more than merely to display your Political and Rhetorical Talents; had you fucceeded in perfwading them, that you was truly affected yourfelf with what you have faid, and firmly believed what you have offered, on fo important and ferious a Subject, I should be apt to conclude you the happiest Man on Earth. But, alas! I am afraid it is quite otherwise; the Public feem to confider you, as of that Species of Beings, which you have judiciously enough diffinguished, in the Introduction to your fecond Series of Facts and Arguments, by the Name of beautiful Monsters, but not quite so beautiful as a Cafar or a Cromwell; these were Paragons in their kind; but they would assign you a fourth or fifth Class amongst those Worthies, who are termed great bad Men: To be plain with you,

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my Lord, tho' they confess your Abilities as a Writer, and admire your Talents as a Premier Orator of the Opposition, yet they doubt your Sincerity; there is no persuading them that you are in earnest, and I cannot help owning myself pretty much of that Opinion; in which I think I am fo well founded, that I resolve to employ the following Pages in perfuading you, that you do not actually believe one Tenth Part of what you have advanced in your three celebrated Pamphlets; but before I proceed to a Task, which I believe most Men will think pretty arduous, viz to convince a Man refolved not to be convinced; I must beg leave to entertain you with the fecond or third Edition of a short Story, which, as honest Teague faid, "was a good "Story when I heard it:" Whether it loses any thing by my telling, I shall leave you to judge.

The Story, My Lord, is told of a certain Irish P-r, I believe of your Lordship's Acquaintance; and if I am not much mistaken, he has the Honour to be related to you; at least if he is not, he has made a bad Bargain at the Heralds-Office and Doctors-Commons; where I am credibly informed, he laid out upwards of Three Thousand Pounds, to make out his Defcent from the Noble Family of the Ivory's, with whom you are fo nearly connected. This worthy P-r had Address enough, by the Interest of the Friends of the Administration, to justle himself into a Seat in a certain august Assembly, and Honesty enough to employ it and the few Talents he supposed himself Master of, to abuse those very Friends who had procured him his Seat. He has a voluble Tongue, a large Share of Affurance, an infinite deal of Pride,

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and an unparallelled Conceit of his own Parts, out of which he is neither to be reasoned nor ridiculed. He does not want Genius, but it is of the Critical Species; he has not Invention fufficient to form, or Steadiness enough to execute any one Scheme himfelf, but is wonderful happy in finding fault with those of other People; as these Talents, added to an unlucky Disposition of betraying every one who trusts him, renders him the Object of Contempt to every Adminiftration, it is no Wonder, therefore, to find him on the Side of every Opposition, however weak and unreasonable, where he endeavours to do all the Mischief in his Power; and, like the Wretch who burnt the Temple of Ephefus, is willing to be famous at any Rate: I need not be more particular with your Lordship, on a Character you are fo thoroughly acquainted with; therefore I proceed to my Story. It happened once, that one in the Ministry made a Motion in the H-e of C-s, for raising a small Establishment for the Sailors in Time of Peace, that might enable his Majesty to have at all Times a Body of these useful Men at Command, sufficient to Man our Fleet on every sudden Emergency, without the invidious and troublefome Method of Preffing. This dangerous Proposal was seconded and spoke to, by several of the Friends of the Administration, and seemed to meet with but too favourable a Reception, from the major Part of the House, which alarmed the zealous and watchful Spirit of your Lordship's Kinsman: He got up, paused, and addreffed himself with all the Grace of Action to the Chair; and in a Speech, of at least an Hour long, painted the Miseries of the Commonwealth with fuch moving Eloquence, dwelt on

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the Charms of Liberty and Wealth, the deplorable Condition of that Nation which wanted those inestimable Bleffings; then endeavoured to make it as clear as the Sun, that if any Encouragement was given to our Sailors, as by this Motion was intended, Popery, Slavery, Beggary, and arbitrary Power, would certainly be imported by the first French and Spanish Pacquet. After he had spoke himself out of Breath, he sat down, and the whole House were so moved by the tragical Harangue, that they fat mute for fome Minutes in Admiration of the Man's wonderful Talents, and perhaps to recollect the true Subject of the Debate, from whence this gloomy Orator had diverted them: At last H----o W-le, a Gentleman of a plain English Address, who, without affecting the Orator, speaks well; and whose Character has raised itself above the Arts of Malice and Faction, to be valued and esteemed by the honest Part of his Country, flood up, and after complimenting the noble P--r in the handsomest Manner, on the Excellence of his Speech, the many rhetorical Beauties he had discovered, and the prodigious Talents he had displayed in the masterly Oration just then delivered; he begged the H---se to indulge him in repeating a short Story, which just then occurred to his Memory: As that Gentleman always speaks to the Purpose, and never wavers from the Point in Debate, he is heard with Deference and Attention; and on this Occasion his Request was granted by an universal Hear-him; when he proceeded to this Purport.

"Mr. S-r, in the latter End of the " Reign of the glorious King William, when this

" Nation was grown giddy with the Happiness so

(7)" Coach and Six with two young Ladies, in order " to visit a neighbouring Gentleman; the Road was " as fmooth as a Bowling-Green, the Horses good, "the Coach Braces and other Furniture strong and " in good Repair. The Coachman drove at an easy, " fleady Pace; yet one of the Ladies screamed out every Minute as if she had been on the "Brink of some Precipice, and ready to be "dashed to Pieces. I addressed, says Sir Tho-" mas, the other Sifter, who fat very quiet, and 66 feemed to enjoy the Pleasure of a fine Road in " a beautiful Country, to know what made her " Sister so terribly asraid? O Lord, Sir, replyed " the Lady, you must not mind my Sister, she is not " at all afraid, she knows she is in no Danger, but " fancies she has a fine Voice, and that Squalling " becomes ber; on this satisfactory Answer, " added Sir Thomas, I left the young Lady to " please berself in ber own Way, without giving " myself any Trouble to convince her that she was

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This little Story, my Lord, of Mr. W——e's needed no Application, it was quickly understood even by the P—r himself; who, in the midst of an universal Laugh of Friends and Foes, sat with immoveable Muscles, and a Countenance for some Moments void of every Symptom of Thought or Meaning; but at last recollecting himself, he was weak enough to get up to answer this Story, and took up another half Hour, to prove that he was not, nor had the least Resemblance to the young Lady in the Coach, and that he was neighber to be laughed, nor reasoned out of his chimerical Notion of National Danger.

I fancy, my Lord, you are fagacious enough to perceive in what Manner I would apply Mr.

II'---!'s

W-le's Story of Sir Thomas Littleton and Mr. How, to you and your Writings, and the near Resemblance between yourself, the faid How, and the young Lady in the Coach. However, as I apprehend you have a small Spice of your Kinfman's Obstinacy, and that it is more than probable you are Proof against the justest Ridicule, I shall humour your Foible, so far as to examine some few of your Affertions, and shall begin with your much laboured Treaty of Hanau, the Promontory from whence you have been pleased to take your Departure; but give me leave to tell you in the same Seaman's Phrase, that however diftinguishable the Promontory may be in the Charts, yet you happen to have miftaken it's I ongitude and Latitude, and this Error has confounded all your Reckonings; this original Mistake has put you quite beyond your inrended Port, and after beating about the Chops of the Channel for two or three Months together, you have the Misfortune to find yourfelf just where you first set out, like a worthy Master of a Vesfel well known in Ireland, who took his Departure from the Hill of Heath, bound for Beston in New England: The poor Man, who had a mighty Conceit of his own Skill in Navigation, beat about the Seas for two Months together, and at last making Land, he swore by his Shoul and St. Patrick's, but it was the Harbour of Boston, when it happened to be nothing else than the Harbour of Cork in Ireland, round which he had wifely made a Compass.

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But to drop the Metaphor of your Departure; permit me first to examine the Treaty of Hanau, in the Light you would impose it upon the Public; that is, let us suppose it a folid, honourable, and definitive Treaty; and the rejecting it necessarily

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productive of the Treaty of Worms, and every Misfortune that has fince happened to this Nation and it's Allies; let us suppose this, and next enquire by whose Means it was rejected; you fay that only four of the L-s J-s rejected it here, and would infinuate, that the Rest of the I --- s were never fummoned; to hinder no Doubt their opposing the Rejection, which we may suppose predetermined by the other Four; let us suppose this true likewise, then obferve what follows; nothing elfe but this, that the Lord G— rejected this folid, honourable, and definitive Treaty, without fufficient Authority; for whether the Regency were fummoned or not, Four could not act as a Regency their Power being limited to a greater Number by their Commission: Lord Granvile knew this, and therefore as a Minister, entrusted by his Majesty, he was highly culpable; first for rejecting the Treaty, and next for rejecting it in the Name of the R -- y, when he knew that only four of that Body had been made acquainted with it, and that it was impossible that any four of them (except as a Majority of the Board prefent, which I really apprehend to have been the prefent Cafe) could give the Sanction of the whole, to any Meafure whatever. It follows then as clear as the Sun, from the Account of the Matter, that this Treaty was rejected by Lord Granvile alone; because if he had fuch a Treaty earnestly at Heart, had been fully bent upon that Measure, from a Conviction of it's Utility; the Negative entered by the four Justices, would never have determined him to reject it, any more than it would have acquitted him, had he been impeached for fuch Rejection. Either then my Lord G— was not in earnest in the Treaty, and only used the Name of the Regency, to shift off the Conferences with P--ce W\_\_\_

W- of Hesse with a better Grace; and in that Case, the whole Superstructure raised upon his being forced into the Treaty of Worms, by the rejecting of that Treaty, vanishes into Va-Members of the Regency with equal Certainty as that of the supposed Four, and so despaired of fi carrying his Pacific Scheme, or he knew that fi the rejecting Four were a Majority of a regular Board of Regency; and in that Case, the invidious Infinuations, with Regard to the four Justices, vanishes also, and the Treaty of Hanau a comes to be rejected by the unanimous Voice of the whole Ministry, Granvile excepted. It is & impossible to suppose that Nobleman sincere in he the Peace, and account for his being the immediate Instrument of rejecting it, without suppo. In fing this last to be the Case; for if he knew or ro fuspected, that a Majority of the Regency would ni have voted for accepting of the Emperor's Terms, ce he never would be fo mad as to take the private Po Opinion of four, for no four could give any more m than a private Opinion, when he could certainly pl find Means to have the Regency fummoned, and reso have procured the Suffrage of the major Part, the for a Scheme, you fay he was fo very fond of: up But if he knew the private Opinion of every Pu Member of the Regency, to be absolutely for rejecting that Measure, he might with safety use ha the Name of the whole, whether transmitted to the him by four or fourteen.

Thus by your Lordship's State of the Case, you are reduced to this Dilemma, either to acknowledge the that he rejected a falutary Measure upon his own, at least without any warrantable Authority, or that the Treaty of Hanau, or rather the Propositions of Hanau, were rejected by the unanimous Opinion of the rest of the English Ministry; and

in that Case, the two Brothers, on whom you are inclined to lay the whole Blame of that Measure, can be answerable only in common with the Rest of the Administration; and considering the Devalue of the Administration; and considering the Devalue of Power they then possessed, and the small Influence they were known to have in the Countinty cil, it would be exceeding hard to determine in such a Case, whether they acted in that Affair from Principles of their own, or yielded to an Influence, they had no Power, whatever might the be their Inclination, to withstand; at least it would four be as equitable to conclude, that they yielded to a Majority against their own known Attachments of to the Pacific System; as to suppose that the Lord to the Pacific System; as to suppose that the Lord to the himself approved of, from the same Motive.

But this, my Lord, is arguing on the Suppofition, that the Propositions made by the Empetor or and transmitted by Lord G—to the Mibuld nistry, were such as ought to have been acms, cepted of, by his Majesty and his Allies; a Supposition which I have only granted for a Moment, to shew you, that in whatever Light you
and reap no Honour from it; and that in spite of all
art, the Glosses and Misrepresentations you can put
of: upon that Affair, it cannot answer the End you
rery purpose in the Enquiry; for either G——le
must be wholly culpable, or the Brothers must
have the Benesit of only a Neighbour's Share of
to the Resection, neither of which would gratify your

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fatisfactory, and infufficient in themselves to produce any other Effect than that of fadling Great-Britain, with an Annual Subfidy, to a Creature of France, without the least Prospect of adding any Degree of new Strength to the common Cause, or bringing the War one Jot nearer to a Conclusion. Your Lordship is to remember, that I here speak of the Propositions that were to have been figned on the 16th of July, and were fent over in that State for the Approbation of the British Regency. But the I am convinced your Lordship and I are of the same Mind, and that you know in your Conscience, that none but Fools and Knaves would have acceeded to them in the Shape they were then in; yet as I do 't expect you will be fo ingenuous as to confess it, I shall take the Trouble to point out such Circumstances as enabled me to form that Judgment of these famous Propositions.

In order to this, let us cast our Eyes on the Arnoles themselves: They were agreed on between P - e W - m of H - e and the L - G - e, on the 15th of July, and

are as follows:

I. The Emperor shall dismiss the French Troops, and engage they shall evacuate Ger-

many.

II He will without Delay, in Conjunction with his Britannic Majesty, form a Confederacy between the States of the Empire and the Maritime Powers, for the public Good, to engage France to a solid and durable Peace.

III. As by this Step his Imperial Majesty forfeits all his Hopes of Succour and Support from France, and his patrimonial Estates are so consumed and wasted by the War as not to surnish him an honourable Revenue; a monthly Sub-

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fidy shall be allowed him, to commence a Month after the Signing of the Treaty, and be continued till a Method can be found of concerting with the States of the Empire, the Means of making a Provision for their Head, suitable to his Rank and Dignity.

IV. As the Queen of Hungary cannot be brought to restore Bavaria and the upper Palatine, till she is satisfied with regard to the Emperor's Pretensions on the House of Austria; his Imperial Majesty agrees to renounce, for himself

and his Succeffors, all Claim on that Head.

V. As foon as this Act of Renunciation is folemnly passed, the Queen shall restore all the Emperor's hereditary Dominions without Excep-

tion or Delay.

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bdy VI. The Queen shall acknowledge the Emperor in Quality of Head and Chief of the Empire; and in Return, his Imperial Majesty shall own her as Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, and use his Interest with the States of the Empire, to revive the Vote for Bohemia, in the electoral College suspended last Diet of Election.

VII. The better to establish a solid Peace, a general Amnesty shall be proclaimed on both Sides, all Confiscations or Sequestrations annulled, and all Hostages and Prisoners of War re-

leafed.

These Articles were to have been signed the next Day, the 16th of July, and till they could be communicated to the several Courts concerned, the following separate Article was agreed on.

That as his Imperial Majesty, in agreeing to the foregoing Article, as the Basis of an Accommodation between him and the Queen of Hungary, depended on his Britannic Majesty, for their being faithfully executed; and as he put an entire

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Confidence in him, the King promifed in Return to serve him with all his Interest, and engaged to procure him further Advantages; in Earnest of which, he was willing to advance him immediately Three Hundred Thousand Crowns, viz. One Hundred Thousand on signing this Act, and the other in two equal Payments of twenty and forty Days. His Majesty also promised to use his good Offices with the Queen of Hungary, that the Emperor's electoral Dominions should be

favourably treated.

These, my Lord, were the public Preliminary Articles, which instead of being signed the 16th of July, as intended, when they were agreed on between Prince William of Hesse and the Lord Granville, were fent over to the Ministry here for their Approbation : But it is necessary to obferve, that the third Article, which regards the Subfidies stipulated to be paid the Emperor, requires some Explanation. By your Lordship's first Account of it in your Examination of the Principles, &c. you suppose that it was to amount only to about One Hundred Thousand Pounds a Year for fix Years, and to be paid in Money. But you are pleased to correct that Account of it, I suppose upon better Information, when you asfume the Character of an occasional Writer; where in Page 27. your Lordship informs us, that " it feems one of the great Objects of the Treaty. " (and I am apt to think the only Defign of the "Treaty) was to make fuch a Provision of Re-" venue for the then Emperor during I ife, as " should enable him to support the imperial Dig " nity; this Revenue was stated at fix Millions " of Florins a Year: For the raising of this Revenue, certain Provinces were to be affigned "him, which he was to hold till another Provi et lion

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fion could be made by the Secularization of the Bishopricks of Saltsburgh and Wurtsburgh (which, tho' understood, was not expressed in the Treaty) and in Case the Produce of these Bishopricks or those Provinces sell short of that Sum, Eugland was to make good the Desiciency."

As your Lordship in your second Series has not been pleased to give us another Account of this Subsidy Article, I shall take it for granted that you are satisfied in this last Account of the Matter; and we may fairly conclude, that England was either to support the Emperor at the Expence of six Millions of Florins a Year, or oblige, by her Sword or Instuence, some other Members of the Germanic Body, to part with their Properties and Privileges to help us to de-

fray Part of the Charges.

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Having thus opened the Substance of the Imperial Propositions, in order to have the whole Question before us; let us examine the State of the War at this Period, and the Situation of the principal Powers concerned in the Treaty. Hungarian Majesty at this Time had recovered Bobemia out of the Hands of the French and Imperialists, who were quite driven out of the Empire; she was in full Possession of all the Emperor's hereditary Countries, and that Prince reduced to fuch wretched Circumstances, that he had not Credit at Francfort for the Necessaries of his Houshold. Prussia and Saxony were both detached from the Interest of France, so that unless the gave these Courts fresh Matter of Resentment, she had no Cause to fear either; and the Emperor on the 27th of July, five Days before the Rejection of the Propositions at Hanau, had entered into a formal Treaty of Neutrality with

the Queen of Hungary at Sconfeld, near Rain, confifting of the following Articles.

I. The Emperor shall remain neuter during the

Continuance of the present War.

II. That his Troops shall engage not to serve against the Queen of Hungary or her Allies; and till a Peace be concluded, shall take up their Quarters in Franconia.

III. That Bavaria shall till then remain in the

Queen's Hands.

IV. Brunau and Schordingen shall be delivered up to the Austrians, and the French and Bavarian Garrisons have leave to retire.

V. The French Garrisons at Ingolf adt and Egra shall be permitted to withdraw, and the Piace shall be garrisoned by the Bavarians, allowing the Austrians the Liberty of the Bridge, and that Part of the Town which lies without the Castle.

VI. All the Artillery, Magazines, and Warlike Stores, belonging to the French in the faid Towns, shall be delivered up to the Austrian Ge-

nerals.

This Convention was immediately carried into Execution; Brunau and Shordingen, in Pursuance of the Fourth Article, were evacuated by the Bavarians, and Egra and Ingolstadt were

foon after furrendered by the French.

The Imperial Diet by their Resolution of May the 10th, had determined to offer their Mediation, and to invite the Maritime Powers to join their good Offices to terminate the Difference between the Emperor and her Hungarian Majesty; and the Emperor, before the concluding of these last Propositions, had offered to refer his Claims on that Princess to the Diet and the Maritime Powers. As to France, my Lord, if we consider her Circumstances, and public Professions, by her Ministers

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nisters and Generals, we have small Reason to doubt of her Inclination to have taken a little Breathing at this Time; and that if we had not furnished her with the Prussian Alliance, she would have been glad of getting out of the Scrape; for so early as the 7th or 8th of June, Marshal Broglio, when he retreated from his Camp at Pladting, fent the Emperor a Meffage to the following Purport: "That his most Christian " Majefty, finding no likelihood of the War be-"ing ended in Germany, as it was then carried " on, was not averse to his Imperial Majesty's "accommodating Matters with the Queen of "Hungary, and obtaining for himself the best "Terms he could; notwithstanding which, his " Master would always shew himself a faithful "Ally and Friend;" and on the 23d of June, the same Marshal peremptorily refused the Emperor all Manner of Affistance, and acquainted his Imperial Majesty, that he had express Orders to return with his Troops with all Diligence to the Rhine; and foon after, M- Noailles caused it to be notified to the Austrian Generals, that his Mafter's Forces were no longer Auxiliaries but Friends, which Notice was to determine all Parties concerned in the Conduct they were to purfue.

And on the 10th of August, after the Propositions of Hangu were rejected; but before the Conferences were absolutely broke off, M—de la Noue, the French Minister at the Imperial Diet at Francfort, delivered a Memorial to this Purport: "That the King his Master, being "informed of their Resolution to interpose their "Mediation for terminating the War, was highly "pleased with it; that his Majesty was no less sa-"tissied with the Negotiation entered into be-

" tween

tween the Emperor and the Queen of Hungary, for adjusting their Differences in an amicable Manner. That as his Troops had only entered Germany in Quality of Auxiliaries, and not till they were called in by the Head, and feveral Princes of the Empire, the most Christian King, as soon as informed, that his Imperial Majesty had embraced a Neutrality, had given Orders to his Forces, to return to the Frontiers of his Kingdom, being glad to give the Germanic Body this Proof of his Equity and Moderation, and the Desire he had of entertaining a good Correspondence with the

" Empire."

Your Lordship has made a different Use of this Memorial in your occasional Letter, to that which I intend to infer from it; and in order to make it answer your Purpose, has thought proper to make free with the Date of it, but without confidering that the Memorial itself detects the Falacy; for you will be pleased to observe, that this Memorial mentions in express Terms, according to your own Quotation, that the Emperor had embraced a Neutrality: Now you are pleased to date this Memorial on the 26th of June, tho' the Neutrality mentioned in it was not entered into, nor fo much as treated of till the 27th. Count Seckendorf and Count Kevenbuller, who negotiated that Convention, not having met till that Day, nor proposed a Meeting any earlier than the 26th, therefore it was impossible that the French Minister or the French King could have any Intelligence of an Event before it happened, or that whatever Conjecture they might form of fuch a Defign before-hand, that they would speak of it in a public Memorial as a Thing concluded, when the Ministers had not yet met

treat of it; from whence it must appear, that is impossible that the Date your Lordship has een pleased to assign it, can be the true Date; nd from that a very fair Conclusion may be d, and frawn, that we have a Right to be very cautious d, and low we admit Facts refting entirely upon your most Lordship's Authority, where you are detected

hat his in fo glaring an Instance.

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From this impartial State of the Circumstances and Dispositions of the principal Parties to the War, it appears, my Lord, that there never was a Period wherein fo many Circumstances concurred, to render the Prospect of a Peace more probable, nor a Point of Time, during the War, wherein the Allies of the Queen of Huneary had it more in their Power to conclude a Peace upon any Terms they pleafed; from whence may venture to conclude, that the Allies were under no Degree of Necessity to agree to any Terms disadvantagious to their Interest, much ess to purchase a Peace; since I cannot remember a parallel Instance in History, nor can I reconcile it to common Sense, that the Conqueror, with his Enemy reduced to the lowest Circumstances, and capable of refusing no Terms offered, should notwithstanding, be obliged to purchase Peace at an extravagant Price of the Party thus vanquished.

With this Observation, my Lord, let us proceed to examine the famous Propositions of Hanau, as transmitted to the English Regency, and enquire how far they are consistent with the Situation of the several Parties concerned. What Alteration do these Articles make in the Affairs of the Emperor? From a Prince without a Foot of Territory, without Credit, or without Allies (for France you must confess had deserted him,

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and left him to shift for himself) he is to be restored to all his Hereditary Dominions, besides a fettied Revenue warranted by the Crown of Britain, of fix Millions of Florins a Year. This is a manifest Alteration of Circumstance, equal to the most fanguine Expectations he could raise to himself from the Success of the War. What then are the Allies to gain by the Concession to his Imperial Majesty, the Alliance of a Prince without Power or Interest, and a Renunciation of a Claim he had no Power to contend for, unless the Allies, by restoring his Territories, and permitting him and his Allies to recover their Losses, should enable them to renew their Pretensions, against which the most solemn Engagements that could be committed to Parchment would be but a trivial Bar. Would it not appear, by the Nature of the Demand, that her Majesty of Hungary was in the Emperor's Situation, without Money, Territory, or Alliance, and that his Imperial Majesty was back'd by the Interest of all the Powers of Europe, and an Army of well paid, well disciplined Troops, of at least a Hundred Thousand Men in the Field.

But, my Lord, these Articles negotiated between Prince William of Hesse and the Lord Granville, were only to be the Basis of a future Treaty, which was to produce a final Determination of the several Disputes, which gave Rise to the War, but did not in themselves conclude the great Work of Peace. All that could be expected from them, or that is generally expected from Preliminary Articles, is that such Concessions should be made in them, as may insure the Disposition of the several contracting Parties to a thorough Reconciliation, by which means it often happens, that some leading and mate-

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al Points are settled in these fort of Convenions, and the more perplexed and less matehal, left to the Discussion of a definitive Treaty. Now, if the Ministers of all the Powers concerned, had been equally bent upon forwarding a General Peace, the Neutrality the Emperor had concluded with the Queen of Hungary, and his fubmitting his Pretentions to the Succession of the late Emperor, to the Decision of the Imperial Dyet and the Maritime Powers, formed a fufficient Basis for an Accommodation between all the Parties engaged in the War, and on that footing the contracting Powers might have proceeded to execute the fecond of these Articles, viz. to form a Confederacy between the States of the Empire and the Maritime Powers, to compel France to a durable Peace, where then appeared the Necessity of Great Britain becoming bound for fo extraordinary a Subfidy, when they certainly had it in their Power, either to oblige the Emperor to accept of Peace without it, or to have obliged the Queen of Hungary, who was the only Gainer by the Success of the War, to furnish the Subsidy required; either the one or the other must have complied, for the Emperor, even joined by France, was in no Condition to carry on the War, and the Queen of Hungary, without our Affistance, was equally unable to maintain her Conquests. It follows of Consequence, that England was under no Necessity to find the Emperor the Subfidy wanted, and that no Reason could be assign'd sufficient to justify the Ministry for loading the Nation with fo extraordinary a Burthen, even upon the Suppolition, that the accepting of these Articles, would have terminated the Troubles of Germany, or left the Queen of Hungary at liberty to prosecute the

the War with full Vigour in Italy. Its true, my Lord, when we take a View of these Articles, even loaded with the extraordinary Expence to this Nation, and stained with the Infamy of purchasing a Peace, when we had it manifestly in our Power to command it, I fay, though we view them in this Light, or indeed in the worst Light they can be put, and confider the Success, and dreadful Expence that has attended the War, we might wish that they had been accepted of, and in that false Light, numbers of People are apt to judge of them; and your Lordship, who is no doubt aware, that it is difficult for the Vulgar to think of them at prefent, without comparing the Expence that would have been incurred by accepting of them, and that fince expended by a War, built a great Part of your Hopes of Success, with that Class of Readers, from your Knowledge, that it was almost morally certain, that they would fall into that way of thinking, and argue from a Medium favourable to the Impressions you intended to raise, but to the Judicious and Impartial the Falacy is eafily perceptible. And to fuch it must appear, that it confidering the Merits of these Propositions, and the Merit, or Demerit of rejecting them, it absolutely necessary to devest the Mind of all ex post facto Prejudice, and consider them in the Light they must appear when they were nego-Su tiated at Hanau, and presented to the English Ministry for their Approbation. At that Period the contingent Expence of a War could be no Part of their Confideration, either in accepting ha or rejecting them. The fole Question term ob nated on this, whether England from her ow Circumstances, that of her Allies, or the Power of the Emperor, could lie under any

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effity to become engag'd for fo large a Subfidy to Support an Emperor, whom all Europe knew to be Creature of the natural Enemy of this Nation, and hat without any visible Accession to this Kingdom of Power or Profit. This must have been the only Question an English Minister could ask himself in deliberating upon those Articles, which he must certainly answer to his own Conscience in the Negative. If, fays he, the Emperor demands this Subfidy as an Equivalent for the Renunciation he is to make to her Majesty of Hungary, it's reasonable, that the Queen of Hungary should become engaged for the Payment, who is to reap the Benefit. It's imposble, that the Emperor can demand it in Lieu of the additional Weight and Influence, which his Person or Name could bring for that was all he could bring) the Common Cause, as it would be over-rating his Interest, when in the Height of his Power. Such a Minister arguing thus calmly, would certainly have rejected those Propositions, in the Shape they appeared on the 16th of July, even upon the Supposition, that they would have had the Effect of a Definitive Treaty, with Respect to the Affairs of Germany.

it i But the Arguments for rejecting those Offers Il ex must appear still in a stronger Light, when we 1 the tonsider that according to the Nature of the rego-Subfidy Article, as explain'd by your Lordship the Occasional Letter, these Propositions eriod would have been o fir from terminating the War that Part of the World, that they would have kindled it afresh, and only changed the Object. To explain this, it's only necessary to Powalk, were we in Possession of those Provinces Ne be affign'd the Emperor? Had we it in our Power to secularize these Bishopricks? No. They

They were to be conquered or negotiated; the Parties concerned were to be beat or bullied into a Compliance with this fecularizing Project; Is it probable the Germanic Body in general, or the King of Pruffia, who was principally interested, would have tamely complied with the favourite Project of the E. of G-le? No. the Alarm that Prince took upon this Part of the Hanau Project coming to be transported into the Treaty of Worms, is a sufficient Demonstration, that this Part of the Hanau Preliminaries, either would have continued the War in Germany, and exchanged the Friendship of a titular Emperor without Influence, or Territory, for the Emnity of the King of Pruffi, and all the Ecclefiatical States of the Empire; or that it must have remained unexecuted, and England continued fadled with an annual Subfidy of Six Millions of Florins a Year, and the Expence of the War into the Bargain.

This, my Lord, is a true and correct Map of the famous Promontory from whence you took your Departure. This, my Lord, is the State of the Hanau Propositions, about which you have raifed fuch a Clamour against the noble Brothers for rejecting it, and on which you build fuch a Fund of Reputation to your Patron the Earl of G-le for negotiating it, and his Willingness to have carried it into Execution, if he had not been prevented, as you fay, by the two Brothers; and I leave it to your own Reflection, if it is possible for you to have built upon a more unlucky Instance to support your Adulation for the one Minister, or the malicious Calumnies you have vented against the other two. It appears evident to the meanest Capacity, from Facts that are public, and may be known

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known to every Coffee-house Politician, without once peeping into the Secrets and Cabinets of Ministers of State, that no Minister could be weak enough to hefitate one Moment about rejecting those Propositions as they then appear'd; and that no Man, who valued his Head, his Reputation, the Honour or Interest of his Country, would have ventur'd to put his Hand to What a contemptible Figure then must your Hero make, if we suppose he has any Likeness to the Picture you have drawn for him? When we fee him, if we take your Word for it, ferious, folicitous and anxious in promoting a Measure so ridiculous and dishonourable to his Mafter and his Country. But forgive me, my Lord, if I apprehend you to be as ignorant of his Lordship's real Intentions, as it now appears to all Mankind you are of the Nature of the Treaty itself; I very much Question if the E--- of G-lle was fincere in the Steps he feems to have taken in that Treaty; it is much more reconcilable to his Views, to his Conduct, and the Abilities the World confess him Master of, to suppose that he entertained those Conferences with Prince William of Heffe, purely to amuse the Emperor, and to gain time for the Conclusion of the Treaty of Worms, which was, at the time of the actual Rejection of the first Propositions of Hanau, fo far advanced, that it was retarded only by the Difputes about the Subfidy claim'd by the Queen of Hungary, which she for some time infifted upon, to be put upon the fame footing with that of the King of Sardinia. It is not material, whether Baron Wassenaer brought the Treaty with him to Hanau or not; it is ablolutely certain, that the Treaty of Worms was in Agitation at the fame time that the Confe-

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rences were continued with Prince William of Hesse, and that they must have been in great Forwardness at the time of rejecting those Propositions, if we consider that the Rejection happened finally on the 2d of August, and that the Treaty of Worms was figned on the 2d of September; for I think we may conclude, fince it is acknowledg'd, that the Queen of Hungary's Subfidy produced some Demur, that a Treaty of that Consequence, consisting of so many Articles, in which fo many Powers were concern'd, must have taken more time than a Month to conclude it from its first Proposition; if we suppose this, we may fairly pay that Compliment to the E-of G-'s Understanding and Honesty, that he had the same Opinion of the Hanau Propositions, which the rest of the British Ministry had, and only used the Name of the Regency (and, perhaps, with their own Confent) to break off with some kind of Decency with the noble Mediator.

Can you, my Lord, who are Master of all Cabinet Secrets, remember what was proposed to have been done with the subsidiary Provinces and seculariz'd Bishopricks after the Demise of the Emperor. I suppose the noble Negotiator did not intend that they should remain in Possession of the House of Bavaria, nor that they should return to their former Owners, but he possibly

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iam of offibly intended they fhould be made over to great he Emperor during Life, with the Remainder e Pro-Reversion to some other Power, who was n haphost at that time in his good Graces. hat the magination will eafily fuggest to you a Prince 2d of the most likely to have the Favour conferred fince apon him, and that may help you to a Reason, why that able Politician might be willing to addle England with the eventual Deficiency of Revenue, and the Guarrantee of the whole to the Emperor, fince, fter his Decease, it was to devolve to fo near a Friend of ours. On this Supposition, (for I must confess I take the whole Story of the Secularization on your Lordhip's Authority alone, and draw the conjectural Condufion as agreeable to your manner of thinkng) the Proposition of Hanau might have infwered the Minister's private Design in drawing his M — into the War, pletty near as well as the Treaty of Worms. I believe it is pretty evident, that the fecularizing Project in that Treaty was the only Motive, I mean perfonal Motive, the Minister had to negotiate that infamous Treaty, and the Difference between Hanau and that, was only the Difference between Territory proposed to be immediately annex'd, and the same suspended for one Life, which last was certainly less precarious than the Contingency of War. Now, if your Lordship will please to be at the Trouble to go through this Chain of Suppositions, you are at liberty for me to conclude, Advances towards the Emperor, and that he would have fign'd the Articles had he been lucky enough to have procured the Sanction of that Part of the Administration, who were possessed of the greatest Share of Popularity, and most F. 2 capable

capable by their Weight and Influence with the People, and their Reputation with the Public, to paliate a Measure which he knew would appear very unpopular; but as he had not to deal with fuch weak or desperate Heads, he had not Courage to take the Measure on himself so dropt it; and as he could not bring his favourite Point to bear in a Treaty calculated for Peace, he transplanted his Project of fecularizing, recovering, dismembering, annexing, &c. to a Treaty for a General War, where Stipulations to the contracing Powers, depending on fo many distant Contingencies, are not so narrowly look'd into. But, my Lord, it is at this time of very little Confequence to the Public, whether that noble Peer was fincere or not, it's fufficient that I have made it evident from the Situation, Circumstances and Disposition of the Powers at War, that it was the Duty of every Minister, influenc'd by the Honour and Interest of this Nation, to have rejected that Class of Propositions settled between Prince William of Hesse and the Earl of Granville, and by this last transmitted to the British Regency on the 16th of July.

But, my Lord, it does not follow, that because these Articles were justly rejected, that therefore the Negotiations for Peace were to be immediately broke off, or that the Rejection of those Propositions, laid that Minister under any manner of Necessity to plunge the Nation headlong into a ruinous and expensive War by the Treaty of Worms. The Error he was guilty of, was not the rejecting the Proposition of the 16th of July, whether he did it of his own Motive, or under the Insluence of the English Ministry, but in not improving the Dispositions the Enemy was in from the Necessity of their Affairs.

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Affairs, to procure an honourable and lafting Peace, for which he could never expect a more favourable Opportunity. It is apparent from the Recital of the State of the War, that the Emperor was not in Capacity to stand out upon his Subfidy, he must have been contented with the Restoration of his Hereditary Dominions and with fuch a Subfidy from the Maritime Powers, as was Equivalent to the Strength he brought to the Alliance, which was proposed to be but Fifteen Thousand Men, and our Quota of a Subfidy corresponding to that Affistance could have borne no Proposition to Six Millions of Florins, and must have continued only during the War. As to France, your Lordship has admitted all along, that that Monarch was fincerely disposed to have acceded to any Peace which would fave him from the Prospect of having the War carried into his own Country. I have not, my Lord, contradicted that Affertion, I have given it its full Weight, and furnished you with stronger Proofs of his most Christian Majesty's Sincerity, than your false dated Memorial, and without any public Proofs we might eafily conclude, that France in the Situation she then was, baffled in all her Projects, much exhaufted in Men and Money, depriv'd of all Pretences by the Emperor's Neutrality, for meddling with the Affairs of Germany, and threatned with an Invasion of her own Territories, both on the Side of Italy and the Rhine, I fay, confidering all these Circumstances, if France had been totally filent, as to her pacific Declarations, we might fairly conclude that she would have listened to any reasonable Terms of Composition that would have given her a Breathing Time. As this is the Cafe, we had no Reason

to fear, if we had granted to the Emperor only the Restoration of his hereditary Dominions, and put him just in the same State he was in at the Death of the late Emperor; that France would have continued the War, from no other Motive, but to procure that Prince a Subfidy from England; no, it is more than probable he would have left it to the Germanic Body, to have provided a Maintenance for the Head they had chofon; and it is more than probable, that the Princes of the Empire would rather have found out some Expedient to furnish the Emperor with a reasonable Subsistance, than have permitted the War to continue, fince whatever Party got the better, the Empire felt all the Calamities of War; at least, I am sure it is much more reafonable, that they should have been at that Expence than England. Upon the whole, my Lord, the Argument turns folely upon this, whe ther if the Emperor had been offered his hereditary Dominions without a Subfidy, he was in any Condition to have rejected that Offer. think there can be nothing more evident, than that he must have accepted of those Terms; if fo the Error was in breaking off the Negociation, before they had been directed to that Isfue, and then negotiating an offensive Treaty, which furnished the Emperor and France with the only Ally in Europe who could alter the Posture of their Affairs.

Your Lordship is to observe, that the Rejection of the Articles transmitted to the Regency, did not break off the Pacific Conference, nor alter the Emperor's Dispositions for Peace; on the contrary he rifes in his Offers; his first Pro-ha positions amounted only to a submitting of his Claims, to the Decision of the mediatorial

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Powers: His next Proposition went a Step further, he promifes to renounce his Engagements with France, and to renounce absolutely all Pretensions to the Austrian Succession: His third and last Proposals were still better; he submitted to fuffer his fortified Towns to be garrisoned by Neutral Forces, and to join the Allies with Fifteen Thousand of his Troops. Now the second Class of Propositions only were rejected by the Regency here; but, if according to your Lordship's Way of Reasoning, those ought to have been accepted, a fortiori, the third ought not to have been rejected, as they were manifestly better: In the second we were to restore him his Dominions, and take his Word that he would stand neuter, whereas the last, which were made by Baron Haslang, the Emperor's Minister after the Rejection of those of the 16th of Ju'y, left the Allies some Security for the Performance of Contract, and brought at least an additional Strength of Fifteen Thousand Men to the Common Cause. Yet these, my Lord, the E-l of Granville rejected of his own Motion, without communicating them to the Miniftry, or having the least Authority from them : tion, Therefore in this Sense, my Lord, the E- of and Granville may be with Truth and Justice confurcluded, the fole Rejector of the Propositions of only Hanau; but, my Lord, I have no Intention to ire of go fo far with my Conclusion; I only infer from hence, that if he thought the Propositions Rejecof the 16th of July a sufficient Basis for an Acency, commodation, he must have concluded those made by B. Haslang much more so, and might-pro- have taken upon him to have signed these, as of his consultance the Proconsulting the Brothers; for since the latter Propolitions wers'

positions varied so much from the first, the Rejection of these had no Connection with the last, and confequently he was under no Necessity of concluding the Treaty of Worms, even if it should be supposed that Peace could be obtained on no Conditions, without England's coming under an Obligation to support the Emperor during Life; had that been the Case, of which the direct contrary is evident, he was still at liberty to have accepted Baron Hastang's Propositions, tho' he had rejected those made by Prince William of Heffe. Thus, my Lord, it is as evident as the Sun at Noon-day, that tho' the Propositions made by Prince William of Heffe were rejected, and rejected upon just and reasonable Grounds, yet the E-l of G-le had it in his Power to have concluded a Peace with the Emperor, and to have put an End to the War in Germany, upon honourable, equitable, and lafting Terms, and that he was under no manner of Necessity from the Rejection of the fo often mentioned Propositions to conclude the Treaty of Worms at any Rate, much less to have concluded it such as it was. For once, let us suppose that the Emperor could not be brought to confent to a Peace without being fecured in a Subfidy, which I own no Minister, possessed of the smallest share of Sense or Honesty, ought in the then Situation of our Foreign Affairs have confented to; let us likewife suppose, that on the former Supposition, it was necessary to take Meafures for profecuting the War; I fay, my Lord, let us make that Supposition, which I think is putting the Argument in the fairest and strongest Light you can desire; yet, my Lord, in negotiating a Treaty for carrying on the War, a Minister of ordinary Capacity would have taken no Step that could engage any other Powers in Supaft,

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port of the Emperor, that were at that Time difposed to remain at least Neutral: At this Period, my Lord, the Emperor had a Dependance on France only, and it is impossible to suppose, that if the Conferences for a Peace had broke off, merely because England would not consent to support the Emperor, or in other Words, confent to purchase what she could command; I fay it is impossible to suppose, that the Refusal could have raised him any one Ally in Europe; and he must in a very short Time have complied, when he found us refolute not to comply with that Demand. But, my Lord, instead of observing that Caution, the Minister, by the Treaty of Worms, furnished him and France with an Ally, upon Motives very different from any that hitherto subsisted; I mean the King of Prussia; the only Prince in Europe capable at that Time of fnatching from us those favourable Circumstances, which enabled us to command the Terms of Peace. Had the Object of the War remained the same it was, at the Time of rejecting the Propositions offered by Prince William of Hesse; that Monarch had no Interest to enter into the Quarrel, especially in Conjunction with France, with whom he was far from being on good Terms; but the Moment the Treaty of Worms was concluded, he was deeply interested in the Event; and from Motives of Interest and Self-Preservation, was compelled into the Meafures of France, and to become a Party to the Treaty of Franckfort, to prevent the fecularizing Scheme, and robbing him of his late Conquetts added to him by the Treaty of Breslaw. It was this, my Lord, obliged him to enter himself a Party in the War, and not any Regard to the Emperor;

Emperor; by this Means, my Lord, that Prince, who at Hanau had no Ally, no Power, no Credit, and was obliged to beg Peace on any Terms, became formidable to the Alliance; and by this Accession of that Strength, which no Policy of his own could have brought him, was able to give a quite different Turn to the Face of Affairs; and if the Plan of the Treaty of Franckfort had been as well executed as it was concerted, had France done what she might, and what was expected of her, the Queen of Hungary must have been foon in the Situation the Emperor was in, at the Time of opening the Conferences of Hanau: But ill executed as it was, that Prince recovered his Dominions; the Affairs of the Allies from that Moment went retrogard; all Sight of Peace vanished, and a Series of uninterrupted Misfortunes attended our Arms till the Peace of Aix.

From hence, my Lord, it is evident, that the Rejection of the Propositions of Hanau by the English Ministry here, put the E- of G under no Necessity to conclude the Treaty of Worms in any Shape; and that neither that Rejection, the Circumstances of the Times, or the Disposition of the principal Powers of Europe, laid him under any Necessity to conclude it fuch as it was, especially with regard to the King of Proffia. His Knowledge of the Powers, Dispositions and Inclinations of that Monarch, with every Principle of found Policy, ought to have directed him to form no Treaty that should interest that enterprizing Prince in the Event of the War; all his Care ought to have been to have preferved that Advantage which the Queen of Hungary then had over the Emperor,

and prevented every Poffibility of alarming any other Powers to take Part in the Quarrel, and to have form'd fuch a Plan for the War, as the King of Prussia, and the rest of the German Princes, equally interested in preserving the Peace of the Empire, might have acceded to, or at least might, consistent with their peculiar Interest and Safety, have remained Neuter. But, my Lord, that Minister, of his own Motion, and without any Restraint or Influence of the Ministry here, and even contrary to the known Maxims of the most considerable of them, purfued a quite different Plan, and as if he had defigned that the Emperor should not remain in the abject defenceless State in which he then was, took care in that famous Treaty to lay the Foundation of that fudden Change, which happened in his Affairs, and furnished France once more a very plaufible Handle to change the pacific Sentiments she lately espoused, and to continue the War with every possible Advantage on her Side.

Thus, my Lord, you may observe, that in whatever Light we place the Propositions of Hanau and the Treaty of Worms, that the noble Person, whose Reputation you undertake to blazon, appears either without Honesty, Policy, or Abilities, either to conclude a Peace under every savourable Conjuncture, or to concert the Plan of a War in the most flourishing State of the Alliance. But, my Lord, I have not taken so much Trouble to bestow either Light or Shade on that Nobleman's Character; he is welcome for my Part, to enjoy the Benefits of the highest Panygeric your Pen can bestow on him. All I aim at in this Discourse is,

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to rescue Truth from the Rubbish into which you have maliciously involved it, and if possible, to convince you, that though the two Brothers were accessary to the Rejection of the Propofitions of the 16th of July, yet that Rejection, which I have proved to be confistant with Honefty, found Policy, and the then apparent Interest of this Nation, did not oblige the Eof G-lle to break off the Negotiations of Hanau, or to neglect improving that favourable Conjuncture for obtaining that Peace, which our Enemies had no Power, and I may fay, Inclination to refuse us; and to convince you, that the Treaty of Worms was not the necesfary Refult of the Rejection of those Proposi-If I have fucceeded in these Points, I think my Lord, you must own, that all the pretended Reasoning, the Exulting, the Train of false and distorted Facts, and the endless Chain of chimerical Suppositions in all your Pamphlets, especially your Occasional Letter, vanishes into Air, and must appear to every Creature, the most impudent Bundle of glaring Falshoods, that ever were imposed upon the Public; for I think your Lordship form'd the whole of the Occasional Letter upon this Supoposition that the Treaty, as you affect to call it, of Hanau, was an honourable, fafe and falutary Measure, that was rejected by the two Brothers, that Rejection deprived him of every Opportunity of concluding Peace, and forced him, compelled him to conclude the Treaty of Werms; from whence you conclude the War which followed, was not the Refult of Granville's Principles or Inclinations, that it was not his War, but that of the two Brothers, and that they are fonly answerable for all the unhappy

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happy Confequences that have fince happened, of which you form a long and melancholly Beadroll to conclude your Pamphlet. Now I have made it appear to use your own Phrase, as evident as any Demonstration in *Euclid*, that every one of your Principles are false, and of course the Conclusion absurd.

How, unhappy is it, my Lord, that the smalleft Glimpse of Truth should fall into the Hands of one of your Lordship's Disposition, and how amazing must be these Talents, who from so fmall a Spark of Truth, could find means to crect fo plaufible a Superstructure into every Member, of which not the Millionth Part of a Grain of the original Truth enters, though to a common Eye, and till it comes to be defected, the whole bears the Air of folemn Truth. Thus from the bare Knowledge that Propositions were made at Hanau, and that some of those were rejected by the English Ministry, you have raifed this hideous Romance, and endeavoured to perfuade the Public, that all the Calamities they have felt fince that fatal Period, was owing to two noble Perfons, whose whole Study and Aim has been to prevent them. that your Lordship might enjoy the Benefit of this Romance in its fullest Extent, you have turn'd it into every possible Shape to bring it to bear upon the two Brothers. In your first Performance, you make it an absolute Proof, that they were utter Enemies to the War, and as a leading Argument that they were determined to ruin it, because it was none of theirs. When you had wearied yourfelf in contemplating your Scheme in that Light, you only shifted Characters, which you know you are perfectly well

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well acquainted with the Secret of, and brought the fame Tale new garnished, and deck'd out with a new Train of Suppositions, to prove that your Hero G-was the most pacific Mortal on Earth, that he was hindered from concluding Peace, and bullied, and compelled into a War by the two Brothers, who were become all of a fudden downright Prize-Fighters; and that the War, which you formerly owned to be Granville's War, was none of his, but belonged absolutely to the two Brothers. Now if the Facts in the Occasional Letter are true, then all the Suppositions, Arguments and Reasonings, and Conclusions in your first Tract are absolutely false, unless two contrary Propositions can be true at the fame time, and on the contrary, if the Facts, &c. in the Examination are true. than the Reasoning in the Occasional Letter is absolutely absurd; and your second Series, which is no more than a dull Repetition of the fame Absurdities must be Partakers of the Fate of both. How unhappy would it be, if it was in the Power of fuch mean, fuch malicious Artifice to hurt the Character of any Man; and how happy the People, who would fubmit to be directed by a Disposition fo malignant, that rather than leave any Man possessed of the smallest Degree of Reputation, would ranfack Hell for Forgeries, and diffort the plaineft, and most manifest Truths into Calumny and Slander.

I had it in my Head, my Lord, when I first fat down to write, to have been at the Trouble of unravelling some more of your groundless Affertions; but I am satigued with the dirty Labour of dipping into so much Scandal; and this Article of your Departure, has taken up

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o much of my Time, that I am refolv'd to eave you some time to reflect upon what I ave said on this Head, as I presume this sufficient to convince the Public how little Regard ought to be had to the Remainder of your pretended Facts, that are ushered in with uch gross, such a labour'd and malicious Misepresentation, as this Affair of the Proposition of Hanau evidently appears to be.

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